

## **The use of AIS data – request by LAP 13**

In reference to action item 13 of the LAP 13 in October 2014 – and partly linked to action item 11 – we would from the Swedish Maritime Administration (SMA) like to share the process of data collection and administration of AIS in Sweden.

The SMA affirmed in 2012 a policy regarding streaming of AIS data. The use of AIS data will according to the policy serve the objectives of the national transport policy in ensuring an economically efficient and sustainable transport system for citizens as well as the industry. The objective of the SMA is to secure a high level of service to customers, whilst maintaining a high quality, avoid accidents and reduce the environmental impact.

Streamed AIS data from the SMA should be used for the following purposes:

- Increased accessibility for customers to the maritime transport system
- Improved maritime safety through reduced numbers of accidents and thus less casualties and reduced impact on the environment
- Improved efficiency in customers' businesses
- Reduce the total impact on the environment by the transport system

Sweden has historically considered AIS data to be reliable. It has not (to our knowledge) been questioned or challenged in a legal context. The SMA has extradited AIS data upon request, but we cannot confirm that it has been in reference to a legal dispute. As far as we know the data has never been subjected to a legal review.

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On the issue of sharing AIS data Sweden has no restrictions, and the data can be shared in public upon request.

**Uncertainty elements**

The liability of AIS data should above all be based on the element of uncertainty. In our point of view AIS data has few sources of error which makes it a highly reliable instrument. The SMA has categorised the uncertainty factors under four headings: aboard ship, in the base station, in the transmitting process and in the data storage.

**Aboard ship**

- Manipulated data, intentional (intentional inaccurate position, or other sensor data to AIS transponder and intentional inaccurate data in the transponder)
- Manipulated data, unintentional (inaccurate position of antennae, or sensor parameters, unintentional inaccurate data in the transponder, typing error, etc.)
- Technical positional failure, or other sensor failures

**In the base station**

- Possible shutdown due to power failure (can lead to reboot)
- Possible shutdown due to transmission problems (can lead to loss of data)

**Transmitting process**

- Loss of positional reports (due to overload on VDL)
- Loss of statistical reports (static messages or voyage messages)

**Data storage**

- Possible shutdown in distribution servers (although unusual as they are redundant)
- Possible shutdown in data recording and storage system (although unusual as there are several systems)